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convincing evidence standard in civil 
cases when "fraud, dishonesty, orcrimi-
nal conduct [was] imputed .... " Id. at 
655-56(citingFirstNat'IBankv. us.F. 
& G. Co., 340 A.2d 275 (Md. 1975)}. 
The court concluded that in order to 
further the purposes inherent in puni-
tive damages and because of their pe-
nal nature the "[u]se of a clear and 
convincing standard of proof [would] 
help to insure that punitive damages 
[were] properly awarded." Id. at 657. 
In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, the 
court of appeals clearly attempted to 
"fix" Maryland law regarding jury 
awards of punitive damages. How-
ever, in adjusting the scales of justice, 
the court simply tilted the scales in the 
opposite direction. While the elimina-
tion of the "arising out of contract" 
distinction was appropriate in light of 
the arbitrariness ofthe rule, and the use 
of clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard was justified by the penal impli-
cation of punitive damages, the court 
tilted the scales in favor of the defen-
dant when it adopted the "actual mal-
ice" standard of conduct. As a result, 
plaintiffs who clearly have been the 
victims of a grossly negligent defen-
dant will find little redress in the Mary-
land courts. 
- Laurie Ann Garey 
Kingv. St. Vincent'sHospital: MEM-
BERS OF THE ARMED FORCES 
RETAIN THE RIGHT TO CIVIL-
IAN REEMPLOYMENT UNDER 
38 U.S.C. § 2024(d} REGARDLESS 
OF THE DURATION OF ACTIVE 
DUTY. 
Justice Souter, writing for a unani-
mous court, authored King v. St. 
Vincent'sHosp., 112 S. Ct. 570(1991}, 
which resolved the conflict surround-
ing the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. 
section 2024(d}(1981 & Supp. 1992}, 
which is known as the Veterans' 
Reemployment Rights Act. The Court 
held that section 2024(d} does not im-
plicitly limit the length of military 
service after which a member of the 
armed forces retains the right to civil-
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ian reemployment. 
William "Sky" King, a member of 
the Alabama National Guard, applied 
to become a Command Sergeant Ma-
jor in the Active Guard/Reserve 
("AGR"}program. Athreeyeartourof 
duty was required by army regulations 
of the person holding that position. 
Upon learning ofhis appointment, King 
notified his employer, St. Vincent's 
Hospital, of his acceptance, requested 
a three year leave of absence, and re-
ported for duty as ordered. Several 
weeks later, St. Vincent's notified him 
that his request was unreasonable and 
was therefore beyond the Act's guar-
antee of reemployment. St. Vincent's 
then brought an action fora declaratory 
judgment in the United States District 
Court for the District of Northern Ala-
bama to settle the question of whether 
the applicable terms of the Act provide 
reemployment rights after tours of duty 
as long as King's. 
The district court held that service 
in the AGR program was protected 
under section 2024( d), but that a three 
year leave of absence was per se unrea-
sonable. King, 112 S. Ct. at 572. The 
court's reasoning paralleled the opin-
ions of the third, fifth and eleventh 
circuits which had held that leave re-
quests under section 2024( d} must meet 
a test of reasonableness. A panel ofthe 
eleventh circuit affirmed the district 
court's decision. Due in part to the fact 
that the fourth circuit had declined to 
accept a reasonableness standard, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the conflict among the circuits. 
The Supreme Court began its analy-
sis by recognizing the importance of 
the wording of section 2024( d), which 
contains no express time limitations. 
The Court noted that the fourth circuit 
had found that the words appear to 
guarantee that leave and reemployment 
be "unequivocal and unqualified," 
whereas the eleventh circuit had ac-
knowledged that the subsection "does 
not address the 'reasonableness' of a 
reservist's leave request". King, 112 
S. Ct. at 573 (quoting Kolkhorst v. 
Tilghman, 897 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865 
(1992»; Gulf States Paper Corp. v. 
Ingraham, 811 F.2d 1464, 1468 (11th 
Cir. 1987)}. St. Vincent's argued that 
"leave," as used in subsection (d), ap-
plies to an "employee," implying that 
the employment relationship contin-
ues during the employee's absence and 
that this relationship is incompatible 
with a leave as long as King's. St. 
Vincent's further argued that a leave of 
this duration would create a burden on 
the hospital to temporarily fill King's 
position for three years until he re-' 
turned to resume his job. 
The Court responded by first recog-
nizing that there is a burden placed on 
employers by this section, however, 
the Court found that it was not "free to 
tinker with the statutory scheme." King, 
112 S. Ct. at 573. The Court further 
stated that it could not render the stat-
ute "susceptible to interpretive choice" 
no matter how great the burden. Id. In 
analyzing the statutory scheme, the 
Court noted that while "subsection (d) 
is utterly silent about any durational 
limit on the protection it provides, 
other subsections of section 2024, pro-
tecting other classes of full-time ser-
vice personnel, expressly limit the pe-
riods of their protection." King, 112 
S.Ct. at 573-74. From this, the Court 
concluded that the simplicity of sub-
section (d) was deliberate and intended 
to provide its benefit without imposing 
conditions on the length of service. 
The Court also explained that it fol-
lowed the "cardinal rule that a statute is 
to be read as a whole," and ''the canon 
that provisions for benefits to mem-
bers of the Anned Services are to be 
construed in the beneficiaries favor." 
Id. at 574. 
The Court next addressed st. 
Vincent's misapplication of the prin-
ciple that a statute is to be read as a 
whole. Although the hospital read the 
statutory scheme to show a hierarchy 
of reemployment rights, the Court held 
that the differences in treatment among 
the various sections of the Act do not 
necessarily amount to a hierarchy. Id. 
at 574. Instead, the Court stated that 
the differences oftreatment should be 
"respected by limiting protection where 
the text contains a limit and leaving 
textually unlimited protection just 
where the Congress apparently chose 
to leave it." Id. at 575. 
This decision had immediate rami-
fications in Maryland because it im-
plicitly affirmed the fourth circuit's 
holding in Kolkhorst v. Tilghman, 897 
F.2d 1282, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865 
(1992). In that case, the fourth circuit 
held that the Baltimore City Police 
Department could not limit the number 
of police officers, other than new hires, 
who are allowed to join active military 
reserve units. In so doing, the fourth 
circuit construed section 2024( d), as 
the Supreme Court did in King, as 
placing no limit on reservists covered 
under the section. 
With the decreasing need for a fully 
staffed and active military in modem 
political climates, this decision also 
has major implications for military 
policy. It ensures a fully trained and 
prepared defense structure while en-
abling cuts in military spending. This 
would increase the amount of money 
which would be available to the private 
sector for things such as loans for small 
businesses. The burdens placed on 
employers by the Act could, therefore, 
be compensated by more government 
spending in the private sector. 
ing and the election process in order to 
come within the Act's province. 
Before engaging in its analysis, the 
Court ventured into the history and 
pertinent parts of the Voting Rights 
Act (" Act"). The Act was created to 
remove race discrimination from vot-
ing. Section 5 of the Act requires that 
any changes in voting procedure with 
respect to "voting qualification or pre-
requisite to voting, or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure" must receive ad-
ministrative or judicial preclearance. 
The Act defines voting to include "all 
action necessary to make a vote effec-
tive." For the purpose of evaluating 
changes made to a covered district's 
voting practices, the Act states that 
such changes should be compared 
against the practices that were in use in 
that jurisdiction on November 1, 1964. 
When the Act was created, Etowah 
County in Alabama employed the 
Etowah County Commission ("Etowah 
Commission") to oversee the mainte-
nance, repair, and construction of the 
county roads. The county was divided 
into four districts. A five-member 
commission was elected at large under 
a residency district system. Four mem-
bers would each receive an allotment 
of funds for discretionary spending on 
the roads in their respective districts. 
The Etowah Commission voted as a 
collective body to determine the initial 
allotments each of the four members 
- Shawn Gritz would receive. The fifth member was 
Presley v. Etowah County Commis-
s~n: ONLY PROCEDURAL 
CHANGES DIRECTLY RE-
LATED TO VOTING AND ELEC-
TION PROCESSES MAY OFFEND 
SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT. 
After consolidating two Alabama 
cases, the United States Supreme Court 
held that changes in an elected official's 
authority did not require preclearance 
under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S. C. 
§ 1973c (1975). In Presley v. Etowah 
County Commission, 112 S. Ct. 820 
(1992), the Court ruled that such a 
change must be directly related to vot-
the chairman who oversaw the solid 
waste authority, prepared the budget, 
and managed the courthouse buildings 
and grounds. 
In 1986, the Etowah Commission 
was restructured and increased to six 
members, with each member elected 
by the voters in a specific district. Four 
members ofthe new commission were 
holdovers from the previous commis-
sion. The newly-formed fifth district, 
which was designed to create a black 
majority district, elected a black man, 
Lawrence Presley. A black citizen had 
not previously held a seat on the Etowah 
Commission in the modem era. Shortly 
after the new members took office, the 
Etowah Commission passed the "Com-
mon Fund Resolution." This resolu-
tion effectively removed the individual 
authority from the commissioners. 
Instead of allocating monies to each 
commissioner, road funds were to be 
kept in common accounts. This al-
lowed a simple majority, such as the 
holdover members, to decide how to 
spend the funds. 
In the companion case from Russell 
County, Alabama, the Russell County 
Commission ("Russell Commission") 
originally comprised three commis-
sioners elected at large. The commis-
sioners were responsible for the road 
shops, crew, and equipment, as well as 
routine road maintenance, in their re-
spective districts. After one of the 
commissioners was indicted for cor-
ruption, the Russell Commission 
adopted the "Unit System" which rel-
egated control over road construction 
to a County Engineer appointed by the 
Commission. The Unit System was 
not submitted for preclearance under 
section 5 of the Act. 
The United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Alabama 
issued a consent decree in 1985 which 
increased the Russell Commission to 
seven members and changed the elec-
tion system to district-by-district vot-
ing. The Department of Justice 
precleared the decree, but did not men-
tion the Unit System, which effec-
tively denied the commissioners con-
trol of the road funds and equipment. 
Ed Mack and Nathaniel Gosha were 
elected to the new seats and became the 
first black commissioners in modem 
times. 
The appellants, Presley, Mack, and 
Gosha, filed a single complaint in dis-
trict court which alleged thatthe county 
commissions had violated section 5 of 
the Act by not obtaining preclearance 
for either the Common Fund Resolu-
tion orthe Unit System. A three-judge 
panel convened by the district court 
found that neither the Common Fund 
Resolution nor the Unit System re-
quired preclearance under the Act. 
In reviewing the history of case law 
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